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Stability of equilibrium production-price in a dynamic duopoly Cournot-Bertrand game with asymmetric information and cluster spillovers

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成果类型:
期刊论文
作者:
Long, Jianjun;Huang, Hui
作者机构:
[Long, Jianjun] Chongqing Technol & Business Univ, Sch Management Sci & Engn, Chongqing 400067, Peoples R China.
[Huang, Hui] Hunan Agr Univ, Sch Business, Changsha 410128, Peoples R China.
语种:
英文
关键词:
Cournot-Bertrand game;asymmetric information;cluster spillovers;bifurcation;chaos control
期刊:
MATHEMATICAL BIOSCIENCES AND ENGINEERING
ISSN:
1547-1063
年:
2022
卷:
19
期:
12
页码:
14056-14073
基金类别:
General Project of Chongqing Natural Science Foundation [cstc2020jcyj-msxmX0026]; Science and Technology Research Project of Chongqing Municipal Education Commission [KJQN202000832]; High-level Talents Program of Chongqing Technology and Business University [1955046]; On-campus Scientific Research Project of Chongqing Technology and Business University [2151018]; Youth Science Foundation of Hunan Agricultural University [18QN31]
机构署名:
本校为其他机构
院系归属:
商学院
摘要:
Bounded rationality, asymmetric information and spillover effects are widespread in the economic market, and had been studied extensively in oligopoly games, however, few literature discussed the incomplete information between bounded rational oligopolists in an enterprise cluster. Considering the positive externalities brought by the spillover effect between cluster enterprises, a duopoly Cournot-Bertrand game with bounded rationality and asymmetric information is proposed in this paper. in our model, firm 1 with an information advantage knows all the price information of firm 2 with an infor...

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