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Idiosyncratic risk, the private benefits of control and investment timing

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成果类型:
期刊论文
作者:
Wen, Chunhui;Xia, Xin*;Yang, Jinqiang
通讯作者:
Xia, Xin
作者机构:
[Wen, Chunhui] Hunan Agr Univ, Sch Econ, Changsha, Peoples R China.
[Yang, Jinqiang; Wen, Chunhui; Xia, Xin] Shanghai Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Finance, Shanghai, Peoples R China.
[Yang, Jinqiang] Shanghai Univ Finance & Econ, Shanghai Key Lab Financial Informat Technol, Shanghai, Peoples R China.
通讯机构:
[Xia, Xin] Shanghai Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Finance, Shanghai, Peoples R China.
语种:
英文
关键词:
Incomplete-markets;Investment timing;Investor protection;Agency conflicts
期刊:
Economics Letters
ISSN:
0165-1765
年:
2017
卷:
153
页码:
65-71
机构署名:
本校为第一机构
院系归属:
经济学院
摘要:
This paper develops an incomplete-markets model of investment timing by a firm's controlling shareholder, who is exposed to idiosyncratic risk and pursues private benefits at the expense of outside shareholders. We show that the timing of investment selected by the controlling shareholder reflects a tradeoff between his incentives to pursue private benefits and the costs of nondiversification. The firm may overinvest or underinvest depending on the magnitude of the agency conflicts. Moreover, our theoretical model predicts that increasing the cash flow ownership of the controlling shareholder will decease the total social welfare, which provides novel testable empirical implications for investment. (C) 2017 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

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