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Does government institutional reform deter corporate tax evasion? Evidence from China

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成果类型:
期刊论文
作者:
Xu, Junbing;Zhu, Minling;Song, Shengying;Wu, Yunxi
通讯作者:
Song, SY
作者机构:
[Xu, Junbing] Minjiang Univ, NewHuadu Business Sch, Fuzhou, Fujian, Peoples R China.
[Zhu, Minling] Hunan Agr Univ, Econ Coll, Changsha, Hunan, Peoples R China.
[Song, Shengying; Song, SY] Jimei Univ, Inst Finance & Econ, Xiamen, Fujian, Peoples R China.
[Wu, Yunxi] Fuzhou Univ, Sch Econ & Management, Fuzhou, Fujian, Peoples R China.
通讯机构:
[Song, SY ] J
Jimei Univ, Inst Finance & Econ, Xiamen, Fujian, Peoples R China.
语种:
英文
期刊:
PLOS ONE
ISSN:
1932-6203
年:
2022
卷:
17
期:
12
页码:
e0273372
基金类别:
major project of the Key Research Base of Humanities and Social Sciences of the Ministry of Education "Research on the Long-term Growth Potential of China's Economy" [18JJD790008]
机构署名:
本校为其他机构
院系归属:
经济学院
摘要:
Exploiting the quasi-natural experiment of the social insurance collection system reform implemented in China in 2000, based on data from China's industrial enterprise database from 1998 to 2006, we use the difference-in-differences method to test the impact of changing the social insurance collection institution on corporate tax evasion. We find that changing the social insurance collection institution from the social security department to the local tax department significantly deters corporate tax evasion. A series of robustness tests also support this conclusion. The reason is changing the...

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