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A Dynamic Stackelberg-Cournot Duopoly Model with Heterogeneous Strategies through One-Way Spillovers

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成果类型:
期刊论文
作者:
Long, Jianjun*;Huang, Hui
通讯作者:
Long, Jianjun
作者机构:
[Long, Jianjun] Chongqing Technol & Business Univ, Sch Management Sci & Engn, Chongqing 400067, Peoples R China.
[Huang, Hui] Hunan Agr Univ, Sch Business, Changsha 410128, Hunan, Peoples R China.
通讯机构:
[Long, Jianjun] C
Chongqing Technol & Business Univ, Sch Management Sci & Engn, Chongqing 400067, Peoples R China.
语种:
英文
期刊:
Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society
ISSN:
1026-0226
年:
2020
卷:
2020
基金类别:
General Project of Chongqing Natural Science Foundation [cstc2020jcyj-msxmX0026, cstc2019jcyj-msxmX0470]; Chongqing Social Science Planning Cultivation Project [2019PY41]; Science and Technology Research Project of Chongqing Municipal Education Commission [KJQN201900816, KJQN201804005]; High-Level Talents Program of Chongqing Technology and Business University [1955046]; Scientific Research Project of Chongqing Radio TV University [ZD2017-04]; Humanities and Social Sciences Research Project of Chongqing Municipal Education Commission [20SKJD072]
机构署名:
本校为其他机构
院系归属:
商学院
摘要:
Many works studied on complex dynamics of Cournot or Stackelberg games, but few references discussed a dynamic game model combined with the Cournot game phase and Stackelberg game phase. Under the assumption that R&D spillovers only flow from the R&D leader to the R&D follower, a duopoly Stackelberg-Cournot game with heterogeneous expectations is considered in this paper. Two firms with different R&D capabilities determine their R&D investments sequentially in the Stackelberg R&D phase and make output decisions simultaneously in the Cournot pro...

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