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The role of equity balance and executive stock ownership in the innovation efficiency of renewable energy enterprises

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成果类型:
期刊论文
作者:
Xu, Xin Long;Chen, Hsing Hung;Li, Yi;Chen, Qi Xia
作者机构:
[Xu, Xin Long] Hunan Normal Univ, Coll Tourism, Changsha 410081, Hunan, Peoples R China.
[Xu, Xin Long] Chinese Acad Sci, Inst Sci & Dev, Beijing 100190, Peoples R China.
[Chen, Hsing Hung; Chen, Qi Xia] Macau Univ Sci & Technol, Sch Business, Taipa, Macau, Peoples R China.
[Li, Yi] Hunan Agr Univ, Sch Business, Changsha 410128, Hunan, Peoples R China.
语种:
英文
关键词:
electricity supply industry, innovation management, investment
期刊:
JOURNAL OF RENEWABLE AND SUSTAINABLE ENERGY
ISSN:
1941-7012
年:
2019
卷:
11
期:
5
页码:
055901
基金类别:
Youth Project of Humanities and Social Sciences of the Ministry of Education in China [18YJC630213]; FDCT [0037-2018-AFJ]; NSFCNational Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC) [0037-2018-AFJ]; Natural Science Foundation of Hunan ProvinceNatural Science Foundation of Hunan Province [2019JJ50382]; Hunan Normal University [2018BQ05]
机构署名:
本校为其他机构
院系归属:
商学院
摘要:
This paper selects China's renewable energy enterprises as a research sample and analyzes the impacts of equity balance and executive stock ownership on these companies' innovation efficiency from 2009 to 2018. The results show that equity balance has significant and positive impacts on innovation efficiency, while there is a significant nonlinear, inverted U-shaped relationship between the executive stock ownership and innovation efficiency. In addition, with changes in the shareholding ratio of the largest shareholder, equity balance and executive stock ownership are substitutive in terms of their impacts on innovation efficiency. Therefore, this paper proposes the following recommendations. The shareholding ratio of the largest shareholder should be controlled within a reasonable range to help force executives and outside blockholders to make decisions in the company's interests. When implementing an equity balance, companies should avoid shareholders' oversupervision of executives, which may restrict executives' enthusiasm for innovation investment. A moderate degree of freedom for management executives should be appropriate. Published under license by AIP Publishing.

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