关键词：
environmental regulation;individual cognition;self-efficacy;heavy metal-contaminated farmland soil;stimulus–organism–response theory
摘要：
<jats:p>Regarding the large-scale heavy metal pollution in farmland, China has innovatively explored a farming measure governance approach of “production while repairing”. However, due to farmers’ difficulty breaking through conventional planting habits, the governance effects need to be more sustainable. Based on 447 survey data of farmers in 14 cadmium-polluted counties (cities) in Hunan Province, this paper uses the Bootstrap method to explore the impact of environmental regulation, technical cognition, and self-efficacy on farmers’ adoption of “variety–irrigation–pH” (VIP) technology. The results show the following: (1) Environmental regulation can effectively improve farmers’ adoption of VIP technology, and different types of regulation are classified as guidance regulation, constraint regulation, and incentive regulation according to the size of their impact. (2) Technical cognition mediates the environmental regulation process influencing farmers’ adoption. (3) In the process of environmental regulation influencing farmers’ adoption of irrigation and pH through technical cognition, the moderating effect of self-efficacy was positive. Enhance the strategic planning of environmental regulation, bolster technological research and development efforts, and nurture innovative agricultural entities that can promote the adoption of VIP technology. The results have practical significance for further guiding farmers to participate in treating heavy metal pollution.</jats:p>
作者机构：
[Xiong, Xiaoling; Li, Jizhi] Hunan Agr Univ, Sch Business, Changsha 410128, Peoples R China.;[Lin, Zejian; Xiong, Xiaoling] Inst Subtrop Agr, Chinese Acad Sci, Changsha 410125, Peoples R China.
通讯机构：
[Jizhi Li] S;School of Business, Hunan Agricultural University, Changsha 410128, China<&wdkj&>Author to whom correspondence should be addressed.
关键词：
heavy metal-contaminated cultivated land remediation;conflict of interest;evolutionary game;ladder multiple supervision
摘要：
<jats:p>The heavy metal pollution of cultivated land in China is severe, requiring remediation. Introducing third-party governance subjects representing market resources is inevitable to realize the specialization and socialization of cultivated land remediation. However, due to the public nature of cultivated land, the confusion about participating parties’ responsibilities and difficulty coordinating interests restrict the expected effect of cultivated land remediation. To this end, a three-party evolutionary game model among the grassroots government, governance enterprises, and supervisory enterprises is constructed and virtually simulated, taking into account the influence of random checks by the higher-level government. We found that the reward and punishment mechanism of the grassroots government, the frequency of random inspection by the higher-level government, and the amount of deduction will influence the strategy selection of the participating parties. Strengthening the awareness of the responsibility of the grassroots government, optimizing the incentive system, establishing a regular spot-check system, and improving the cost of non-compliance by enterprises can effectively resolve conflicts of interest among the participants. The study results have practical significance for further enhancing the remediation efficiency of heavy metal-contaminated cultivated land.</jats:p>
作者机构：
[夏芳] Business College of Hunan Agricultural University, Changsha, 410128, China;Hunan Agricultural Enterprise Development Research Center, Changsha, 410128, China;[肖春生] Hunan Provincial Tobacco Company, Changsha, 410004, China;[李继志; 刘文丽; Zeng S.] Business College of Hunan Agricultural University, Changsha, 410128, China, Hunan Agricultural Enterprise Development Research Center, Changsha, 410128, China
通讯机构：
[Liu, W.] B;Business College of Hunan Agricultural UniversityChina
